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Abstract 
Centera uses cryptographic hash functions as a means of 
addressing stored objects, thus creating a new class of data 
storage referred to as CAS (content addressed storage). 
Such hashing serves the useful function of providing a 
means of uniquely identifying data and providing a global 
handle to that data, referred to as the Content Address or 
CA. However, such a model begs the question: how certain 
can one be that a given CA is indeed unique? 
In this paper we describe fundamental concepts of crypto-
graphic hash functions, such as collision resistance, pre-
image resistance, and second-preimage resistance.  We 
then map these properties to the MD5 and SHA-256 hash 
algorithms, which are used to generate the Centera content 
address. Finally, we present a proof of the collision resis-
tance of the Centera Content Address. 
1 Introduction 
EMC introduced Centera in April 2002, ushering in a new 
model of data storage referred to as Content Addressed 
Storage, or CAS [8]. The two principal ideas Centera intro-
duced were a node-based structure referred to as RAIN, for 
redundant array of independent nodes, and an object store.  
Centera presents a flat object store to the application. Ap-
plications submit data and are returned a global handle that 
uniquely refers to the data stored. The handle returned is a 
function of the data submitted. Upon submission, a 256-bit 
handle — called the Content Address, or CA —  is calcu-
lated and returned to the application [20]. Nodes are di-
vided into two groups: Access Nodes, which act principally 
as gateways between the cluster and the client application 
server; and Storage Nodes, which act principally as semi-
autonomous storage containers. Data objects are referred to 
as blobs, and the associated metadata containers are re-
ferred to as clips. 
The CA serves the twin role of unique data handle and 
MDC (Manipulation Detection Code). It is the hashing 
function that allows for the latter role. Since the CA is cal-
culated based upon a bit representation of the content itself, 
any modification of the content results in a different CA. 
Centera takes advantage of this property for achieving 
cache coherence and detecting when a file on disk has been 
damaged or in some way altered. Detail of this mechanism 
and the RAIN structure can be found in the Centera Prod-
uct Description Guide [9]. 
In this paper we provide a general description of hash func-
tions and their properties. We then focus on the MDx and 
SHA-x family of hash functions as the MD5 and SHA-256 
schemes are currently employed by Centera for a portion of 
the CA calculation. We then describe the most common 
forms of attack on hash functions and relate those specifi-
cally to the Centera addressing schemes. Finally we present 
a proof of the collision and preimage resistance of the full 
CA used by Centera as the handle to stored clips and blobs. 
2 Hash Functions 
A hash function maps bit strings of an arbitrary finite 
length to fixed-length hash values. On the one hand a hash 
function must be fast to compute, but on the other it must 
also be collision-resistant, i.e. it must be computationally 
infeasible to find a collision (that is a pair of messages with 
the same hash value) [11]. Additionally, hash functions are 
intended to resist inversion (i.e. finding a message from a 
given hash value).  
The basic idea of cryptographic hash functions is that a 
hash value serves as a compact representative image 
(sometimes called a message digest) of an input string, and 
can be used to uniquely identify that string. There are sev-
eral types of hash functions [6][25]. The best known are:  
 Hash functions based on block ciphers; 
 Hash functions based on modular arithmetic; 
 Hash functions based on cellular automata; 
 Hash functions based on knapsack problem; 
 Hash functions based on algebraic matrices; and 
 Dedicated hash functions. 
In this paper we focus on dedicated hash functions. Read-
ers interested in a non-mathematical treatment of hash 
functions and cryptography are referred to [28] and [27] 
respectively. 
2.1 Definitions 
Perhaps the most widely known definitions for collision 
resistance, preimage-resistance, and second-preimage resis-
tance come from the Handbook of Applied Cryptography 
(HAC) [2] which is based in part on the work of Preneel 
[5] which is the seminal work in this area, providing exten-
sive treatment of cryptographic hash functions according to 
the information theoretic, complexity theoretic, and system 
based approaches. For our purposes we will rely primarily 
upon his descriptions. † EMC2 Corporation, Hopkinton, MA USA 
‡ EMC2 Corporation, Mechelen, Belgium 
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The following terms are basic to cryptography in general 
and hash functions in particular. 
Definition 1: A one-way hash function (OWHF) is a func-
tion h satisfying the following conditions:   
1. The argument X can be of arbitrary length and the 
result h(X) has a fixed length of n bits. 
2. Given h and X, the computation of h(X) must be 
“easy”. 
3. The hash function must be one-way in the sense that 
given a Y in the image of h, it is “hard” to find a 
message X such that h(X) = Y (preimage resistant) 
and given X and h(X) it is “hard” to find a message 
X X′ ≠  such that ( ) ( )h X h X′ =  (second-preimage 
resistant). 
Definition 2: A collision resistant hash function (CRHF) 
is a one-way hash function with the additional property that 
the hash function must be collision resistant: this means 
that it is “hard” to find two distinct messages that hash to 
the same result. That is, given any two distinct inputs 
,X X ′  it is computationally infeasible to hash to the same 
output such that ( ) ( ).h X h X ′=  
Note that “preimage resistant” is alternatively referred to as 
one-way; “(second) preimage resistant” is referred to as 
weak collision resistant; and “collision resistant” is referred 
to as strong collision resistant. Further mathematical rigor 
to the definition of these terms can be found in [2] and 
[17]. 
Definition 3: An n-bit hash function has ideal security if it 
satisfies the following conditions: 
1. Given a hash output, producing a preimage or sec-
ond preimage requires ~ 2n operations. 
2. Producing a collision requires ~ / 22n  operations. 
Definition 4: Manipulation detection code (MDC)  is the 
umbrella term used to describe the class of hash functions 
that are unkeyed. 
The tradeoff that must be considered when choosing a spe-
cific algorithm in this class is the tension between effi-
ciency of computation versus degree of security. The two 
are often inversely related. Because the speed of a hash 
function is typically of critical importance, many block 
ciphers – while providing excellent security - are too slow 
to be practical. This gave rise to specialized hash functions, 
which are designed from scratch with speed as a principal 
consideration. 
Definition 5: Message authentication code (MAC) is the 
umbrella term used to describe the class of hash functions 
that are keyed. While the introduction of a key adds state, it 
has the positive effect of allowing for expanded use of the 
hash function, with applications in areas such as digital 
signature authentication. For example, Centera uses a 
keyed MAC to validate operations between management 
station(s) and the Centera server. 
A MAC is a function which takes the secret key k (shared 
between Alice and Bob) and the message m  to return a tag 
MACk(m). Here, Eve represents the adversary (eavesdrop-
per). Eve sees a sequence (m1,a1), (m2,a2),…,(mq,aq) of 
pairs of messages and their corresponding tags (i.e., ai = 
MACk(mi)) transmitted between the parties. Eve breaks the 
MAC if she can find a message m, not included among 
m1,m2,,…,mq, together with its corresponding valid authen-
tication tag a = MACk(m). Eve’s success probability is the 
probability that she breaks the MAC. 
Hash functions are generally not keyed. However, there is 
interest in using cryptographically strong hash functions as 
the basis for MAC schemes. Bellare et al. [16] describe a 
means of using an iterative hash function as the basis for a 
MAC by keying the hash function via the initial vector, 
instead of the more common mechanism of inputting the 
key as part of the data hashed by the function. 
2.2 Iterated Hash Functions 
Most known hash functions (including MD5 and SHA) are 
based on a compression function with fixed size input; they 
process every message block in a similar way. The infor-
mation is divided into t blocks X1 through Xt. If the total 
number of bits is not a multiple of the block length, the 
information is padded to the required length (using a so-
called padding rule). The hash function can then be de-
scribed as follows: 
 
0
1( , )    1, 2,...,
( ) ( )
i i i
t
H IV
H f X H i t
h X g H
−
=
= =
=
 (2.1) 
Where IV is the abbreviation for Initial Value (or Initial 
Vector); 1iH − serves as the n-bit chaining variable between 
stage i – 1 and stage i; and the result of the hash function is 
denoted with h(X). The function f is called the round or 
compression function, and the function g is called the out-
put transformation. It is often omitted (that is, g is often the 
identity function); in the case of Centera, g maps bit strings 
to a base32-notation (digits 0-9 and A-V), which has no 
impact on the security of the hash. Two elements in this 
definition have an important influence on the security of a 
hash function: the choice of the padding rule and the choice 
of the IV. Figure 1 illustrates the mechanics of a typical 
iterated hash function [2]. 
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Figure 1.  Iterated Hash Functions 
It is recommended that the padding rule is unambiguous 
(i.e., there do not exist two messages that can be padded to 
the same padded message); at the end one should append 
the length of the message; and the IV should be defined as 
part of the description of the hash functions (this is called 
MD-strengthening, after Merkle and Damgård). In some 
cases one can deviate from this rule, but this will make the 
hash function less secure and may lead to trivial collisions 
or second preimages. Note that the function f, the IV, and 
the padding scheme are publicly known. 
Research on hash functions has been focused on the ques-
tion: which properties should be imposed on f to guarantee 
that h satisfies certain properties? Two partial answers have 
been found to this question. We state them here for the case 
that g is the identity function. The first result is by Lai and 
Massey [29] and gives necessary and sufficient conditions 
for f in order to obtain an “ideally secure” hash function h. 
Theorem 1 (Lai-Massey) Assume that the padding con-
tains the length of the input string, and that the message X 
(without padding) contains at least 2 blocks. Then finding a 
second-preimage for h with a fixed IV requires 2n  opera-
tions if and only if finding a second-preimage for f with 
arbitrarily chosen Hi-1 requires 2n operations. 
The fact that the condition is necessary is based on the fol-
lowing argument: if one can find a second-preimage for f in 
2S operations (with s < n), one can find a second-preimage 
for h in 1 ( ) / 22 n s+ + operations with a meet-in-the-middle 
attack [5].  
A second result by Damgård [15] and independently by 
Merkle [24] states that for h to be a CRHF it is sufficient 
that f is a collision resistant function. 
Theorem 2 (Damgård-Merkle) Let f be a collision resis-
tant function mapping l to n bits (with l – n > 1). If an un-
ambiguous padding rule is used, the following construction 
yields a CRHF: 
  
1
1 1
1
1
(0 || )
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( )
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=
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 (2.2) 
Where || denotes concatenation of bit strings and 10n+  in-
dicates a sequence of  n+1  bits, all being zero. 
The proof that the resulting function h is collision resistant 
follows by a simple argument that a collision for h would 
imply a collision for f for some stage i. The inclusion of the 
length-block, which effectively encodes all messages such 
that no encoded input is the tail end of any other encoded 
input, is necessary for this reasoning [2]. 
Recent findings [11] show that for a typical n-bit iterated 
hash function, one can find a second preimage for a 2k -
block message in about / 2 1 12 2n n kk + − +⋅ +  operations for 
long messages, assuming unlimited memory. 
3 MDx and SHA Functions 
The MDx functions are a form of “Dedicated hash func-
tions” defined earlier in §2. The MD4 [21] hash function 
was introduced by Ron Rivest in 1990. While weaknesses 
were discovered with MD4 [15][30][32], MD4’s signifi-
cance is that it served as the starting point for the develop-
ment of a series of similar iterated hash functions. MD4-
derived hash functions include the 256-bit extension of 
MD4 [23] and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) designed 
by NIST/NSA, later substituted by the slightly revised 
SHA-1 [10]. Additionally MD4 is optimized to be highly 
efficient on 32-bit word computers and is thus able to pro-
duce 128-bit hash results far quicker than alternative meth-
ods, e.g. via modified block ciphers.  
To counter the weaknesses discovered with MD4 Rivest 
introduced MD5 [22] in 1991 to strengthen the hash func-
tion accordingly. MD5 differs from MD4 on the following 
points [3]. 
• A fourth round was added. 
original input:  x 
append padding bits 
append length block 
preprocessing 
hash function h
g 
output:  ( ) ( )th x g H=  
iterated processing 
compression  
function f 
f 1i
H −  
ix  
tH  
iH  
0H IV=
formatted 
input 1 2... tx x x x=  
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• The second round function has been changed from the 
majority function ( ) ( ) ( )X Y X Z Y Z∧ ∨ ∧ ∨ ∧ to the 
multiplexer function ( ) ( ).X Z Y Z∧ ∨ ∧ ¬  
• The order in which input words are accessed in rounds 
2 and 3 was changed. 
• The shift amounts in each round have been changed. 
None are the same now. 
• Each step now has a unique additive constant. 
• Each step now adds in the result of the previous step. 
Where ∧  denotes bit-wise AND, ∨  denotes bit-wise OR, 
⊕  denotes bit-wise XOR, and Z¬ denotes the bit-wise 
complement of Z.  
3.1 MD5 Detail 
MD5 is perhaps the most extensively covered dedicated 
hash function in the literature, likely due to its popularity. 
Rivest details the algorithm and provides sample C source 
in [22]. Schneier provides a survey of several of the more 
frequently used hash functions in [7]. For our purposes a 
subset of that information is sufficient. 
The MD5 algorithm follows the iterative structure de-
scribed in §2.2, where the hash is computed by repeated 
application of a compression (or round) function to succes-
sive blocks of the message. The message to be hashed is 
first padded to a multiple of 512 bits and then divided into 
a sequence of 512-bit message blocks. The compression 
function takes two inputs, a 128-bit chaining value and a 
512-bit message block, and produces as output a new 128-
bit chaining variable, which is input to the next iteration of 
the compression function [4]. In every step one of the 
chaining variables is updated. A typical step operation of 
the round function is 
( (( ( , , ) ) ),A B A B C D X K s= + +Φ + + <<  
where X is the 512-bit input block (split into i 32-bit 
words), + denotes addition modulo 322 , Φ is the round-
dependent Boolean function (e.g. XOR), K is the step-
dependent constant, and << s denotes a left circular shift by 
s positions [12].  
Rivest defined four 32-bit variables (referred to as chaining 
variables) that are initialized to the following values: 
  
 = 0x01234567
 = 0x89abcdef
 = 0xfedcba98
 = 0x76543210
A
B
C
D
 (3.1)
  
There are four nonlinear functions, one used in each opera-
tion (a different one for each round). 
 
1
2
3
4
( , , ) ( ) ( )
( , , ) ( ) ( )
( , , )
( , , ) ( )
X Y Z X Y X Z
X Y Z X Z Y Z
X Y Z X Y Z
X Y Z Y X Z
= ∧ ∨ ¬ ∧
= ∧ ∨ ∧ ¬
= ⊕ ⊕
= ⊕ ∨ ¬
Φ
Φ
Φ
Φ
 (3.2)
  
These functions are designed so that if the corresponding 
bits of X, Y, and Z are independent and unbiased, then each 
bit of the result will also be independent and unbiased. The 
function 1Φ is the bit-wise conditional: If X then Y else Z. 
The function 2Φ is the bit-wise conditional: If Z then X else 
Y. The function 3Φ is the bit-wise parity operator [7]. After 
the last message block has been processed, the final chain-
ing value is output as the hash of the message. 
3.2 SHA Functions 
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [10] is a digest algo-
rithm proposed by the US NIST (National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology) agency as a standard digest algo-
rithm in August 2002. NIST released a first version of this 
algorithm — referred to as "SHA" back in 1992. It subse-
quently discovered a weakness with SHA and released a 
second version which it referred to as "SHA-1”. 
Where SHA-1 has a 160 bit hash value, NIST also defined 
hash functions with larger hash output such as SHA-224 
(224 bits), SHA-256 (256 bits), SHA-384 (384 bits) and 
SHA-512 (512 bits). The cryptographic community gener-
ally considers SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 to be 
stronger than MD5. 
Detail on the internals of the SHA family can be found in 
[10]. 
4 Hash Collisions 
MD5 satisfies the necessary conditions to be classified as a 
OWHF. As such it is widely used in security protocols such 
as TLS and IPsec. Perhaps due to its speed of computation, 
MD5 is among the most frequently used hash functions in 
use today. However, researchers have forged collisions in a 
subset of the round functions in MD5 [3][12]. Moreover, at 
Crypto 2004 a paper was presented [30] that demonstrated 
artificially constructed MD5 hash collisions between two 
1024-bit streams having a 6 bit difference. More details on 
the methodology are available in [31]. 
Researchers have also found a methodology [33] to induce 
collisions in a reduced-round version of SHA-1. However, 
since it still requires a supercomputer to calculate a colli-
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sion for SHA-1, no practical collisions are known pres-
ently. 
SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 are considered very se-
cure and no attacks are known presently. 
4.1 Practical Effects of Induced Collisions 
It is important to contrast the results of theoretical work, 
where collisions can be constructed based on specially 
crafted inputs that differ in a small number of bits, versus 
the use of a hash function in practice on real data. 
For practical use in a content addressed system such as 
Centera, the more important concern in the ordinary course 
of usage is how likely it will be that two distinct messages 
(files in this case), will actually resolve to the same hash 
value. This is different from the results for specially crafted 
inputs that are intended to have the same hash value. As the 
next section describes, the probability of naturally occur-
ring collisions is exceedingly small.  
4.2 Non-induced Collisions 
As stated in §2.1 Definition 2, for a hash function to be 
strong collision resistant it must be one-way (i.e. both pre-
image and second-preimage resistant) and it must be hard 
to find two distinct messages that hash to the same result. 
As used in Centera, in the worst case a preimage or second-
preimage for a given file would not be found on average 
until 1272≈  (170 billion billion billion billion) unique files 
were stored on a single logical cluster (refer to Theorem 1). 
Producing a hash collision between any two distinct files 
using just MD5 would not be found on average until 642≈  
(18 billion billion) unique files were stored on a single 
logical cluster (refer to formula (5.2)). 
The next sections apply the properties of hash collisions to 
the three naming schemes used by Centera. 
5 Collision Probabilities of Centera CA 
Centera has three naming schemes, referred to as M, GM 
and M++. The M naming scheme returns a 128-bit CA that 
is simply the MD5 hash of the associated content. The GM 
naming scheme returns a 256-bit CA that is comprised of 
an MD5 hash of the associated content, a random bit-string, 
timestamp, counter and header bits. The M++ naming 
scheme returns a 256-bit CA that is comprised of the MD5 
and a truncated SHA-256 hash of the associated content. 
Detail for M is provided in §5.2; GM detail is provided in 
§5.4; M++ is treated in §5.5. For now the salient point is 
that the various naming schemes return CAs of different bit 
size (128 bits for M and 256 bits for GM and M++), and 
hence have differing collision probabilities and preimage 
resistance. 
5.1 Birthday Paradox 
Question: Ignoring leap years, how many people need to be 
present in a room for there to be ≈50% chance that some-
one in the room shares (i.e. collides with) your birthday? 
Answer: 253 (as shown in (5.1) below)1. 
 
253364
1 0.50
365
− ≈⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (5.1) 
However, if you change the question to include one key 
difference, the answer changes dramatically.  
The modified question is: how many people need to be 
present in a room for any two people to have ≈50% chance 
of sharing the same birthday?  Answer: 23. This number is 
surprisingly low, which leads to this phenomenon being 
given appellations such as “birthday surprise” or “birthday 
paradox.” The surprisingly small result for the second 
question becomes clear when you consider that with 23 
people in the room there are 253 pairs of people in the 
room; i.e., 23 22 / 2 253.⋅ = Of course, for this result to 
hold the people in the room must have an even (random) 
distribution of birthdays; clearly this result would not stand 
if the room was full of twins. 
We now add some rigor and generalization to the birthday 
paradox. 
Theorem 3: Let ( , )collisionP N q  denote the probability to 
have at least one collision when we throw q > 1 balls at 
random into N > q buckets, giving us equation (5.2) below. 
 
( 1)
( , ) 0.5collision
q q
P N q
N
−≤  (5.2) 
In this paper we only present an upper bound to 
( , )collisionP N q  since that is relevant for our collision prob-
ability calculations. For a more exhaustive proof, including 
a lower bound, readers are referred to [26]. 
Proof:  Let iC  be the event that the i -th ball is thrown in a 
non-empty bucket, i.e. it collides with one of the previous 
balls. Then [ ]iP C  is at most ( 1) /i N−  since when the i-th 
ball is thrown, there are at most 1i −  different occupied 
buckets and the i -th ball is equally likely to land in any of 
them. Now we have, 
                                                                 
1 This maps to a preimage or second-preimage hash collision. 
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1 2
1 2
( , ) [ ... ]
[ ] [ ] ... [ ]
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...
( 1)
2
.
q
q
collisionP N q P C C C
P C P C P C
q
N N N N
q q
N
= ∨ ∨ ∨
≤ + + +
−≤ + + + +
−≤
 (5.3) 
From equation (5.3) we see the quadratic relation between q 
and ( , ).collisionP N q  This is the core of the birthday para-
dox. You only need to throw about N  balls into N buck-
ets to achieve a reasonable probability of ending up with 
two (or more) balls in the same bucket. 
5.2 Centera with the M naming scheme 
If a large number of messages are hashed using a given 
hash function, collisions will occur “by chance” after a 
very large number of messages have been hashed. Exten-
sive statistical tests have been performed in the past on 
MD5 (for example in the RIPE project [19]), and no devia-
tions from random behavior have been detected. This im-
plies that modeling MD5 in this respect as a random func-
tion will result in a very good approximation of the colli-
sion probability. 
MD5 hashes data into 128-bit strings. Relating to the proof 
in (5.3) we can state that 1282 .N =  Therefore, once a 
threshold of 642q = files is reached, collisions will be 
found very quickly. More precisely, if 642q α= ⋅ files are 
hashed, then we can derive from formula (5.2) that the 
probability that one or more collisions occur is upper 
bounded by (5.4). 
 
64 64 2
128
2 ( 2 1)
2 2 2
α α α⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ≈⋅  (5.4) 
Note that Centera typically operates with very small values 
of α  (e.g., .000000001) since the total file count in the 
system is substantially less than 642 files (18 billion billion 
files). 
Table 1 indicates the probability of a CA collision when 
using the M naming scheme for various fill rates. 
Number of 
objects
Capacity with avg file 
size 10 bytes
Capacity with avg file 
size 1K
M Collision 
Probability
1.E+06 10 Megabyte 1 Gigabyte 1.E-27
1.E+07 100 Megabyte 10 Gigabyte 1.E-25
1.E+08 1 Gigabyte 100 Gigabyte 1.E-23
1.E+09 10 Gigabyte 1 Terabyte 1.E-21
1.E+10 100 Gigabyte 10 Terabyte 1.E-19
1.E+11 1 Terabyte 100 Terabyte 1.E-17
1.E+12 10 Terabyte 1 Petabyte 1.E-15
1.E+13 100 Terabyte 10 Petabyte 1.E-13
1.E+14 1 Petabyte 100 Petabyte 1.E-11
1.E+15 10 Petabyte 1 Exabyte 1.E-09
 
Table 1. Collision Probability using the M naming scheme 
Such numbers are sufficiently large that it’s difficult to get 
a sense of magnitude. Using time as the dimension, assume 
a hypothetical CAS application capable of storing 10,000 
files per second to a Centera cluster. Using an average file 
size of 1K, writing 1510 such files would take up an exabyte 
of protected storage. However, it would take several mil-
lennia to fill up the cluster at this rate. As a point of com-
parison, after 1,000 years of continuous operation the prob-
ability of a CA collision using the M naming scheme is less 
than 1 in 1,000,000,000. 
In the case of a malicious user seeking to forge two arbi-
trary files which return an identical M content address (this 
is referred to as “collision resistance”), then the user must 
attempt to apply the work described in [30][31] to Centera. 
In the case of a malicious user seeking to forge a file X′ 
which gets an identical M content address as a given file X 
(this is referred to as “preimage resistance”), one can at-
tempt to apply the ideas described in [11]. Knowing that 
the maximal file size in Centera is 100Mb, we have less 
than 212  512-bit blocks in one file. We can conclude that 
on average about 128 21 1 1082 2− + =   MD5 evaluations are 
required to forge a preimage of a given file X. Although 
this effort can happen offline, the number is sufficiently 
large to make such attacks impractical.  
5.3 Random Generators 
In order to move towards the stronger GM naming scheme, 
we need the following definitions from the HAC [2]. 
Definition 6: A pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) is a 
deterministic algorithm which, given a truly random binary 
sequence of length k, outputs a binary sequence of length 
l k≥  which “appears” to be random. The input to the 
PRBG is called the seed, while the output of the PRBG is 
called a pseudorandom bit sequence. 
Definition 7: A pseudorandom bit generator is said to pass 
the next-bit test if there is no polynomial-time algorithm 
which, on input of the first l bits of an output sequence s, 
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can predict the (l+1)st bit of s with probability significantly 
greater than ½. 
Definition 8: A PRBG that passes the next-bit test is called 
a cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator 
(CSPRBG). 
5.4 Centera with the GM naming scheme 
Although the probabilities of having collisions with the M 
naming scheme are minimal, a second naming scheme, 
called GM, was introduced which includes additional ran-
dom bits in the resultant CA. This additional randomness 
has the effect of further reducing the probability of colli-
sions. 
The Centera GM CA contains the following components: 
• M: a 128 bit MD5 hash based on the file content; 
• G: a 70 bit random string generated by a crypto-
graphically secure pseudorandom bit generator; 
• T: a 35 bit timestamp, with second resolution (ac-
tually, one unit of T is 1024 milliseconds); 
• C: a 10 bit counter; and 
• H: 13 bits used as “header” codes. 
5.4.1 Timestamp and counter 
The timestamp T significantly reduces the probability of 
collisions by effectively partitioning the entire Centera sys-
tem into sets of files that have been written within about 
one second of each other. Incoming files are time stamped 
by the access node through which the file enters the cluster 
the first time. The timestamp T overflows after a little more 
than 1,000 years. 
Suppose that the peak write speed to a Centera is S files per 
second per access node. Given A access nodes in a Centera,  
we conclude that the upper bound for the number of files 
having identical timestamp T is equal to .A S⋅  
Every access node in Centera maintains a 10-bit counter C 
which is increased for every new file stored on the system. 
The value of this counter C is randomized across the access 
nodes and repeats after each 1,024 files stored through the 
access node. An upper bound for the number of files hav-
ing both identical timestamp T and identical counter C is 
(5.5). 
 10 102 2
A S A SA A⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥+ ≈ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (5.5) 
This formula holds for S larger than A, which is always the 
case. For very large values of S, the addition of A can be 
omitted as having minor impact on the result. Note that the 
A term is due to a quantization effect because it is not pos-
sible to split documents into pieces for access node proc-
essing (e.g., when 1025 documents are assigned C values 
from the 1024 possibilities, at least one value will be as-
signed to at least 2 documents). 
5.4.2 Applying the Birthday Paradox 
In order for a collision to occur using the GM naming 
scheme, all components M.G.T.C.H of the blob address 
must be identical for two distinct files.  
In §5.4.1 we showed that the impact of the timestamp T 
and counter C effectively limits the size of the set in which 
we can  have collisions, to approximately  10/ 2A S⋅  files 
(assuming that S is much larger than A).  
The component H is non-random, hence it does not help to 
reduce the probability of collisions. 
The components M and G are fully random and add up to 
128+70=198 bits (see §5.2 for the randomness of M and 
§5.4 for the randomness of G). 
Applying the birthday paradox to a set of 10/ 2A S⋅  balls 
thrown into 1982  buckets, we end up with the probability 
of a collision with the GM naming scheme indicated in 
(5.6). 
 
2 2
20 198 219
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
A S A S⋅ ⋅=⋅ ⋅  (5.6) 
 
The number of possible combinations (T, C) over a large 
time interval is equal to the number of milliseconds in that 
time interval. 
If we run a Centera system for a period of Z milliseconds, 
then for large values of Z, the probability of experiencing a 
collision during these Z milliseconds is indicated in (5.7). 
 
2
219
( )
2
A S Z
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⋅
 (5.7) 
5.4.3 Collision Probability with GM  
In a typical Centera setting, an upper bound for A is 100 
different access nodes, and an upper bound for S is 10,000 
small files per second per access node. Running this ex-
periment for 1,000 years, we get 133.15 10Z = ⋅  millisec-
onds. Feeding this into equation (5.7) we end up with the 
probability described in the equation (5.8) below. 
 
2
219
41(100 10, 000)
2
4 10Z −
× ≈ ⋅⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (5.8) 
In short, the probability of a collision in the GM naming 
scheme is 41~ 4 10−⋅  assuming an ingestion rate of 
1,000,000 files/second over a period of 1,000 years. Note 
that this is an extraordinarily high ingestion rate over a 
long period of time. In the practical usage of Centera, the 
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collision probability will be several orders of magnitude 
smaller.  
To help put this into perspective, the probability of a CA 
collision is less likely than a bit error on disk (the non-
recoverable Bit Error Rate (BER) of a typical ATA disk is 
~1 for every 1510  bits read). As mentioned in §1, in addi-
tion to using the CA as an object handle, Centera uses the 
CA as an MDC. Therefore, in the event of a bit error on 
disk, Centera will detect this error via a background task 
that periodically checks the validity of a file image on disk 
against its CA. In the event a manipulation is detected, 
Centera will automatically replace the bad file with a good 
copy, thus insuring data integrity over the life of the ar-
chive. 
In the case where a malicious user wishes to forge two ar-
bitrary files which result in an identical GM content ad-
dress (CA), the user needs to mount an online attack 
against a Centera system. One strategy would be to start 
from a known M collision (as described in [30]) and at-
tempt to write the colliding file to all access nodes simulta-
neously within the same millisecond. In this way the at-
tacker would seek to get some control over the M.T.C.H 
components of the GM content address (cf. §5.4). Within 
that millisecond, the user would attempt to write to A ac-
cess nodes in parallel and hope for a collision in the 70-bit 
G component. Since A is typically very small (less than 
100), coupled with the time it would take to perform the 
writes, it would take millions of years before such an attack 
is successful. 
For the same reasons, forging a second preimage in an at-
tempt to overwrite an existing GM file, is infeasible. 
5.5 Centera with the M++ naming scheme 
As discussed in §5.4, the GM naming scheme as imple-
mented does not allow for single-instance store2. For those 
applications that would like to retain this ability, but use a 
stronger naming scheme than M, a third naming scheme 
was created. This 256-bit naming scheme, called M++, is 
constructed by the concatenation of 128 bits of MD5, 8 bits 
of formatting and 120 bits of SHA-256. The calculation of 
object names in this naming scheme requires more CPU 
cycles due to the introduction of the extra hash function 
evaluation. 
Joux demonstrates that, contrary to Fact 9-27 in [2], the 
concatenation (or “cascading”) of two iterated hash func-
tions is only as strong as the strongest of the two hash func-
tions [1]. The following results apply to the M++ naming 
scheme. 
                                                                 
2 More precisely, GM – as presently implemented – does not al-
low identical objects to have identical names. The function, sin-
gle-instance store, is anticipated to be activated for the GM 
naming scheme in a later release of CentraStar. 
When writing M++ objects to a Centera, collisions become 
likely after 2124 objects have been stored on the system (cf. 
the M naming scheme where this number is 264). This can 
be validated by looking at formula (5.2) and substituting q 
with 2124 and N with 120 128 2482 2+ =  to reach a collision 
probability of ≈50%. 
After 1,000 years of continuous operation, a hypothetical 
CAS application capable of storing 10,000 files per second 
on a Centera system would have stored 143.15 10⋅ files. 
This results in a collision probability of 10-46 for the M++ 
naming scheme (cf. 10-9 for the M naming scheme). This 
can be validated by looking at formula (5.2) and substitut-
ing q with 143.15 10⋅  and N with 120 128 2482 2 .+ =  
A malicious user wishing to induce a collision for M++ 
will need to calculate ~267 SHA-256 hash function evalua-
tions. Potential future optimizations of the MD5 attacks 
described in [30] have no impact on this result. This result 
is achieved as follows. One can try to create a 260-fold mul-
ticollision for MD5 using the techniques of Wang et al. 
[30] combined with the ideas of Joux [1]. This requires 
about 60 times more work than creating a single collision. 
The length of the resulting file will be at least 120 blocks 
of MD5, i.e. 7,680 bytes. Next, one searches within this 
space of 260 files for a collision for the leftmost 120 bits of 
SHA-256. One expects to find such a collision by the 
birthday paradox. The effort required is 60 67120 2 2≈i  
evaluations of SHA-256. 
In case a malicious user wants to forge a second preimage 
in an attempt to overwrite an existing M++ file, we can use 
the ideas outlined in [11] to show that an effort of about 
1192  SHA-256 evaluations is required. 
5.6 Summary of naming schemes 
The introduction of the GM and M++ naming scheme il-
lustrates the flexibility of the Centera architecture, specifi-
cally designed to allow for seamlessly switching amongst 
naming schemes. Cryptography will continue to evolve, 
and due to the high importance in the commercial and mili-
tary world, hash functions will be under continuous scru-
tiny. Therefore, it is important that Centera is able to adapt 
its content addressing schemes to reflect the state of the art 
in cryptology. 
Table 2 summarizes the strength of the various naming 
schemes. 
The second column estimates the number of files that need 
to be written to a Centera system before collisions become 
likely. 
The third column lists the effort required for an attacker to 
forge a collision, i.e. to forge two files X and X′, which 
result in the same content address on a Centera. Note that 
this is not the same as starting with a file X, and creating a 
second file X′ which has the same content address. 
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The fourth column lists the effort required for an attacker 
to forge a second preimage. For this the attacker starts with 
a file X and its content address, and the intent is to forge a 
second file X′ which gets the same content address on a 
Centera. 
Note that for the M and M++ naming schemes, an attacker 
could attempt to create a collision or a second preimage 
offline. However, for the GM naming scheme, all attacks 
need to happen online since the attacker has no control 
over the 70 bits random G part of the content address. This 
effectively makes attacks against GM infeasible, since it 
would take millions of years to execute these attacks. 
 Number of files 
beyond which 
collisions 
become likely 
Work required 
to forge file 
collision 
Work required 
to forge 
2nd preimage of 
a given file X 
M 264 files stored O(1)3 O(2108) 
GM Not possible Not possible Not possible 
M++ 2124 files stored O(267) 2119 
Table 2. Summary of naming schemes 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have described basic principles of opera-
tion for iterative hash functions in general and MD5 in par-
ticular. We then described the naming schemes used within 
Centera and mapped the properties described earlier to the 
Centera Content Address (CA). We demonstrated the like-
lihood of a CA collision in a Centera cluster. Finally, we 
concluded that hash functions will continue to evolve, and 
that the Centera system is architected to quickly adjust its 
naming scheme strategy to the latest insight in the relative 
strengths of cryptographic hash algorithms. 
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